----- Original Message -----
From: Dai Williams
To: DU-list
Sent: Tuesday, November
06, 2001 10:19 AM
Subject: Depleted Uranium
in the Afghan War
This analysis has been sent to
the UK Government and media requesting an
urgent answer to the questions
it contains. Is Depleted Uranium the "dense metal"
used in the new generation of
hard-target smart bombs and cruise missiles? If so
how many have been used in the
Afghan war and where? What precautions are
intended for ground forces and
civilians?
Depleted Uranium in the Afghan War:
Are
ground troops and civilians at risk in "hard target"
smart
bomb and cruise missile target zones?
Update by Dai Williams, independent DU researcher, 30 October 2001
Summary
Internet sources from 1997
to date indicate that several 'hard target' versions of smart bomb and
guided missile
systems used by Allied forces
in Afghanistan may contain Depleted Uranium (DU) as a major component to
increase their penetration
effect.
Of particular concern are
systems that use the US "Advanced Unitary Penetrator" technology, or UK
developed
MWS technology with "shaped
charge" penetrators.
Reports from the Center for
Defence information suggest that at least 500 tons of smart bombs and cruise
missiles have been used
in the first three weeks of the Afghan war. They are most likely to have
been used on
"high value targets" e.g.
Taliban and Al-Qaeda command centres, airfields and other military installations.
This information is offered
for verification with governments and military authorities out of concern
for potential
DU exposure to UK, US and
other Allied ground troops expected to be involved in search missions for
Osama
bin Laden and other Al-Queda
or Taliban leaders. Also due to concerns for potential exposure to local
civilians,
international aid workers
and media personnel.(1)
The US and UK governments
take the view that use of Depleted Uranium in weapons presents no significant
hazards to human health.
They have also denied that it is used in missile systems. However information
from
Jane's Defence indicates
that it has been used in at least one anti-tank missile system and in "shaped
charge
warheads".(2) Analysis of
multiple sources suggest that it may be a key component of several recent
guided
weapon system upgrades.
Internet Sources
This report is based on three direct Internet sources plus links to manufacturers' websites from these prime sites:
Jane's Defence Information http://www.janes.com
General information about weapons systems, manufacturers bulletins and
actions in the Balkans (4). Huge
range of subjects, informed summaries but detailed information about weapons
systems only available to
subscribers. More DU information was available during the Balkans war.
Good access.
Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org
Extensive information about weapons systems (5), historical records of
government procurement plans and
weapons development. Some pages seem quite old so need verification for
most recent progress from other
sources (e.g. Jane's).
Center for Defence Information, Washington http://www.cdi.org
Very concise strategic summaries of US military information by ex-military
personnel. Its Terrorism Project
gives a daily assessment of Afghan war operations and prime systems (6).
Not as detailed as Jane's or
FAS but easy to access, good links and useful for cross-referencing with
other sites.
Military uses and health aspects of Depleted Uranium
DU has been used in weapons
systems in the USA, UK, Russia and Israel for at least 15 years and exported
to
over 20 nations. It has
two special qualities for use in military applications:
a) Very high density (1.7x heavier than lead) which gives it high kinetic energy for its volume.
b) Pyrophoric properties - DU ignites at high temperature, melting through
armour and adding
incendiary effects to its munitions.
Depleted Uranium (Uranium
238) is the main by-product of refining Uranium ore for nuclear fuel. It
emits high
energy but very short range
Alpha radiation. In its pure metallic state it is relatively stable and
safe to handle (e.g.
if ammunition is handled
with gloves). However it presents two main health hazards:
DU ignites at high temperature and burns into DU Oxide - a fine, Alpha-radioactive,
toxic dust, easily
inhaled, widely dispersed by wind and water, very hard to detect and to
remove from the environment or the
lungs.
Military DU is not pure. It includes small quantities of highly radioactive
and toxic isotopes including U236
and Plutonium due to recycling nuclear fuel rods in DU processing. It was
probably these other elements
that enabled the UNEP survey team to trace DU in Balkans target zones.(3)
DU oxide contamination has
been suspected as one source of Gulf War syndrome for several years. Other
recently acknowledged radioactive
elements may be an additional factor in long-term illnesses, cancers and
birth
defects suffered by civilians
and veterans or their children exposed to DU during the Gulf War, and in
Leukaemia
deaths of some NATO troops
following the Balkans war.
Suspected of DU in hard target guided weapons
Since the Gulf War it has
been known that several weapons systems use DU e.g. 30 mm armour piercing
shells
fired by A10 planes and
120 mm shells fired by tanks. Both were used in the Gulf war. 30 mm shells
were the only
DU munitions declared by
the USA / Nato during the Balkans war.
The use of DU in smart bombs
and cruise missiles was denied by Nato spokesmen during the Balkans war.
However, as a result of
anomalies between UNEP findings early this year and radiation reports during
the
Balkans war this possibility
was researched again in January and February this year.(2)
The US and UK governments
have been reluctant to discuss military uses of DU and its potential hazards.
Both
declare that research proves
DU is not a hazard to troops or civilians but take radiation precautions
when using it
in test situations.
In April 1999 Greek scientists
reported a dramatic increase in atmospheric radiation levels two weeks
after the
start of the Balkans air
war. I have been informed that they subsequently lost their jobs and their
research was
closed down.
One explanation for the Greek
measurements might be that DU has been used in larger weapons systems,
and
therefore in far larger
quantities and different locations than previously declared or studied.
Hard target guided weapons used to date in the Afghan War
First clues to the potential
use of DU in guided weapons were picked up in the following document on
the FAS
website:
[Air Force Mission Area Plan (MAP)]
ANNEX F Common Solution/Concept List (U)
[as of 11 July 1997 - Rev 10]
at http://fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/docs/mast/annex_f/part26.htm
This included references
to introducing or upgrading at least 9 systems to include "dense metal"
penetrators or
ballast to increase their
penetration effect and hard target capability. NB most cruise missile and
guided bomb
systems have several warhead
options e.g. for blast, sub-munitions (e.g. cluster bombs) or hard target
capability.
It is the hard target versions
that are of concern here.
Only two high-density metals
are usually mentioned in descriptions of kinetic energy weapons - DU and
Tungsten. Both are similar
in density (Specific Gravity 18+) but very different in material and manufacturing
costs.
They may also be used in
alloys.
Study of the Jane's, FAS
and CDI websites indicates a number of smart bomb and guided missile systems
with
upgraded features matching
those described in the 1997 concept document. [NB: Abbreviated names /
code
numbers may be confusing.
Some refer to guidance systems, some to the main vehicle and some to warhead
types. The following notes
have tried to make these distinctions clear].
Of these hard target systems
the following have been reported on the CDI website, or expected to have
been
used by the Jane's website,
in Afghanistan since 7 October 2001.
For health and safety reasons
the crucial question to ask the US and UK governments is this: Is the
'dense metal' used in any
of these systems Depleted Uranium, or an alloy including DU?
1. Laser or GPS Guided Bombs
GBU 28 Bunker Buster bombs and the upgraded version GBU 37: 5000 lb bombs
of which 4,400 are
"dense metal" penetrators. The GBU-37 upgrade uses a BLU-113 penetrator,
improving on the converted gun
barrels used for the original GBU-28 version improvised in the Gulf War.
CDI's Action Update for Oct 11 refers: "Underground bunkers were also targeted
using the 5,000 lb bunker
buster… B-52's and B-1's with cluster and other penetrating bombs (possibly
the BLU-109 and BLU-113 -
DoD would not specify); enormous secondary explosions reported."
GBU 24 Paveway III. 2000 lb bombs using the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator
(AUP) weighing 1700
lbs. "The AUP features an elongated narrow diameter case made of a tough
nickel-cobalt (steel) alloy called
Air Force 1410. The AUP maximises sectional density by reducing the explosive
payload and using heavy
metals in the warhead case." (Note: this FAS description is the most explicit
about the combination of alloy
casing and dense metal ballast that seems to define the AUP penetrators,
produced in several sizes). Designed
to destroy hardened aircraft hangers and underground bunkers. Designed
to replace the BLU-109.
2. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)
GBU 29, 30, 31, 32 feature 250, 500, 2000 and 1000 lb bombs respectively
with all-weather GPS
guidance systems. Originally designed by adding control fins to the BLU-109
and 110 hard target bombs.
The new AUP warheads are designed to be direct substitutes for the 109
and equivalent bombs with twice
the penetration power for the same size and weight. Refer 1997 proposed
specifications on the FAS
website and summary table in Tip of the Iceberg (2). Are AUP warheads now
in use in JDAM systems?
CDI reported 500 JDAMs used in week 1.
3. Cruise missiles
AGM-86D CALCM (air-launched cruise missile). New version converted by Boeing
from earlier nuclear
warhead versions to include a 2000 lb Lockheed Martin Advanced Unitary
Penetrator (AUP-3M) using "dense
metal ballast". Long range missiles for hard target capability e.g. underground
command bunkers. Most likely
for targeting command posts in mountain caves as well as open locations.
Jane's reports expects use of CALCM's in the Afghan operation but CDI reports
do not mention them, except
perhaps included in total cruise missile numbers (50-60 in week 1).
US Navy sources denied use of DU in BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles during the
Balkans war except for testing
dummy nuclear warheads. But the Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant commissioned
in May 1999 "will be
modified to incorporate the government-furnished penetrator warhead (AUP?)
and the hard-target smart fuze".
Delivery was scheduled for 2003 so it seems less likely that DU has been
used in Tomahawk attacks in
Afghanistan yet - unless for testing pre-production prototypes. This increases
the likelihood that the AGM
86D has been the cruise missile of choice for strategic "high value targets".
The 1997 procurement plans
included a series of Small Smart Bombs (SSB's) weighing 250 lbs with 'the
same
penetration capabilities
as the BLU 109' - using "boosted penetrators with high density payloads".
Proposed
applications included delivery
as sub-munitions by Tomahawks and Joint Stand Off Weapons (JSOWs). Whether
these have been actually
been developed for use in Tomahawks or JSOW's is not known.
Jane's refer to other guided
systems in Afghanistan that include sub-munitions options with anti-armour
capability or
shaped charge penetrators
e.g. the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon), and SLAM-ER (Standoff Land
Attack Missile - Expanded
Response). There is insufficient data to know whether these systems include
suspected
DU components. However the
UK BROACH warhead system (see below) was evaluated for the JSOW in 1998.
The AGM-158 JASSM (Joint
Air to Surface Standoff Missile) has not been referred to in Jane's or
CDI reports.
However its 1000 lb P31
penetrator with "dense metal case or dense metal ballast" was specifically
identified in the
1997 procurement list. So
far there is insufficient information to know whether it has been discontinued,
is under
development, or has been
used in prototype or production form in Afghanistan. It may be included
in the unspecified
air launched systems used
in Afghanistan. If so it is another potential DU based missile system.
Further information
required.
Potential UK involvement in DU guided weapons systems
Another form of hard target
system is the UK developed BROACH two stage MWS (Multiple Warhead System)
with a "shaped charge" penetrator.
The 2000 lb version was developed
to prototype trial stage in summer 1998 for competitive evaluation with
the
Lockheed Martin AUP for
the upgraded Boeing AGM 86D CALCM. It was ground tested in South Wales
and
may have been field tested
in the Operation Desert Fox and the Balkans War. But British Aerospace
Royal
Ordnance lost the Boeing
contract to Lockheed Martin later in 1999.
The 1997 procurement list
source suggested that a 1000 lb version of this alternative MWS hard target
technology was also under
consideration for other applications e.g. the AGM 158 JASSM. It is not
known
whether BAe/RO have continued
development or production of BROACH /MWS warheads.
The BROACH system needs similar
DU investigation with the UK government, even if it has been discontinued.
If
it is currently in use,
in production or prototype form, and if it has or may be used in Afghanistan,
its "dense metal"
specifications need to be
investigated. It is very curious that Jane's' description of DU uses included
"shaped
charge warheads" in February
2001 (quote below) but that this description has been edited out of the
current
website version (link below):
Extracts from Jane's Defence website (Feb 2001)
DU is a heavy metal that, when alloyed with titanium (up to 0.75% by weight),
becomes a material
with a density (18,600kg/m3) and ductility suited to making penetrators
for kinetic energy anti-tank
munitions, or liners for shaped-charge warheads.
During the Balkans operations from 1992 to 1996, only the US Air Force
acknowledges its use in
some of its 30mm cannon shells fired from the GAU-8A cannon.
It is true that some guided weapons used depleted uranium to increase the
penetration effect and
that the 20mm Phalanx close-in weapon system, used to protect warships
at sea from sea-skimming
missiles, also has a percentage of DU rounds.
Current description at http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw010108_1_n.shtml
Evaluation of potential DU hazards in Afghanistan
One disturbing comment from
Jane's was that the Military do not always know the materials used by
manufacturers since some
may be used interchangeably. Since the US DoD and UK MoD both take a public
view that DU is not hazardous
(at least in its metallic form) then the Military do not need any special
instructions
for munitions that may contain
DU. If this logic is sustained there is no reason to conceal the past or
current use
of DU in smart bomb or cruise
missile systems.
However if Military commands
from any of the Allied forces have doubts about the potential use of DU
munitions
against hard targets in
Afghanistan this will be a matter for urgent and full information exchange
between the
forces and governments concerned.
Note: although this paper
concerns guided weapons that may contain DU any use in conventional systems
e.g.
armour-piercing shells from
the AC 130 gunship matter too.
The immediate operational
concern is the likelihood that Special Forces will be expected to enter
and inspect
strategic target locations,
underground bunkers and caves if accessible. Unlike anti-tank shells which
leave
distinctive entry holes
there may not be obvious way for troops to distinguish potentially DU contaminated
locations from other bomb
damage.
Local geography and climate
may be important if significant quantities of DU have been used. Afghanistan
has
more in common with Iraq
than the Balkans - arid terrain prone to strong winds and dust storms.
300 tons of DU
was declared in the Gulf
War. Elevated radiation readings are still reported in some areas, years
later.
The new generation (post
1997) of guided bombs and cruise missiles with hard target capability may
be using
DU in considerable quantities
to achieve the increased penetration effects claimed by several upgraded
systems
- possibly 50% of the overall
weight.
The majority of hard target
bombing appears to have been accomplished in the first two weeks of the
campaign.
What's done is done. Potential
DU use remains to be acknowledged, quantified and target locations identified.
The 18 months delay for
the UNEP survey after the Balkans war will not be psychologically or politically
acceptable in the current
conflict. However if DU has been used and this becomes known to the Taliban
and Al
Quaeda it may encourage
them to evacuate strategic target locations at the earliest opportunity,
and not attempt
to return.
If DU munitions have been
used in populated areas then contamination levels need to be assessed at
the
earliest opportunity - not
only for Allied troops but for the welfare of local civilians, aid and
media workers. Scarce
water supplies are a special
concern.
Unlike anti-tank shells guided
bombs and missiles containing DU seem likely to oxidise most of the ballast
load
and to dissipate the resulting
DU oxide (and embedded isotopes) over a considerable area in debris and
dust-clouds.
Weapons designers and commissioning
forces should have already evaluated these effects if the DoD and MoD
acknowledge the potentially
toxic and carcinogenic effects of DU oxide dust. No DU safety evaluation
data for
these systems has been located
yet.
Questions for the US and UK Governments
The basic questions asked in Tip of the Iceberg remain to be asked and answered publicly:
1.Which guided
weapons systems (i.e. guided missiles, smart bombs and sub-munitions) use
Depleted
Uranium as the "dense metal" involved in hard target penetrators, by itself
or in alloy with other metals?
2.How many
of the 1997 hard target system concepts have been produced in prototype
or production form,
or are still under development?
3.How many
of these systems or their derivatives have been used in live tests and
military operations since
Operation Desert Storm?
4.How many
countries currently have stocks of DU in guided or other weapons systems?
And now these questions about its suspected use in Afghanistan:
5.
Which and how many weapons containing DU have already been used in the
current Afghan War, and
where? Have DU weapons been
used there before?
6.
What is the estimate dispersal pattern of DU oxide fallout for each weapon?
Will independent observers
e.g. UNEP be allowed to
commence environmental monitoring immediately?
7.
What precautions will be taken to protect Allied ground troops from potential
exposure to DU
contamination?
8. What
precautions will be taken to protect civilians and international aid teams,
media, water supplies and
agricultural land in potentially
contaminated regions?
These concerns were submitted
to the UK Government by Sir Paul Beresford MP at my request last week.
Their
answers are urgent in view
of the imminent despatch of UK and other Allied ground forces, and the
welfare of
those already there.
These questions also have
implications for communities and veterans involved in several recent conflicts
who
may have been in the vicinity
of smart bomb or cruise missile targets. They may require fundamental
re-evaluation of the consequences
of DU health hazards and whether DU weapons systems comprise weapons
of indiscriminate effect.
The potential use of DU in
hard target guided weapons has obvious tactical military advantages. But
its potential
effects in large scale bombing
campaigns may cause long term hazards for troops and civilians that seriously
outweigh most military justifications.
Dai Williams, independent
researcher
Surrey, UK
eosuk@btinternet.com
References to previous discussion papers available from the author
1. Need for a DU Civilian Safety Handbook. 10 January 2001
2. Tip of the Iceberg? -
apparent use of Depleted Uranium in bombs and missile systems. 25 Feb 2001.
Includes
more links to original sources.
3. Use of Depleted Uranium
in the Balkans War: will the UNEP report include "Dirty" DU and missile
targets? 13
March 2001, updated 5 June
2001
Links used in this report
4. Janes report on Air and Missile strikes in the Afghan war
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jdw/jdw011007_1_n.shtml
5. FAS links to guided missile and bomb specifications:
http://www.fas.org/man/index.html
6. CDI Terrorism Project Action Update:
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/actionupdate.cfm
____________________________________________________________