European Parliament http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm
Verbatim Report of Proceedings in original language
(English translation below)
SITTING OF TUESDAY I, 9 APRIL 2002
Defence / armaments (DU in Afghanistan)
----------------------------------------------------------
2-157
Lannoye (Verts/ALE). - Monsieur le Président, je voudrais évoquer
une question qui relève des deux politiques
qui font l'objet du débat de cet après-midi. Il s'agit
de la problématique liée à l'utilisation d'armes et
de munitions à
l'uranium appauvri.
Je rappelle que le 15 janvier 2001, le Parlement européen a voté
une résolution demandant l'adoption d'un
moratoire sur l'utilisation de ces armes et munitions. Récemment,
le 27 mars 2002, le programme des Nations
unies pour l'environnement publiait les résultats d'une étude
portant sur six sites touchés par des munitions à
l'uranium appauvri en Serbie et au Monténégro pendant
la guerre des Balkans de 1999.
L'étude confirme une contamination générale pour
cinq des six sites concernés; pour deux de ces sites, on note
la présence de particules d'uranium appauvri dans l'air avoisinant.
Les résultats des mesures montrent que les
poussières d'uranium appauvri ont été largement
dispersées dans l'environnement à la suite de l'impact de
ces
munitions.
Même si le niveau de pollution radioactive est considéré
comme faible par le programme des Nations unies pour
l'environnement, il n'en reste pas moins que cette pollution confirme
les risques qu'une utilisation d'armes et de
munitions à l'uranium appauvri font courir aux militaires, bien
entendu, mais aussi aux populations civiles, pour
plusieurs générations sans doute.
Aujourd'hui, même si aucune information officielle ne le confirme,
de nombreux éléments accréditent la thèse
selon laquelle une partie importante du territoire afghan massivement
bombardé a été contaminée par l'uranium
appauvri: déclaration du Secrétaire d'État Romsfeld
évoquant un site contaminé, inquiétude exprimée
par des
scientifiques pakistanais et surtout confirmation de l'usage de bombes
téléguidées avec pénétrateurs en métal
très dense, probablement de l'uranium appauvri.
Selon nos informations, le PNUE devrait entamer, dans les prochaines
semaines, une étude relative à l'impact de
la guerre sur l'environnement. Des questions demeurent cependant que
je voudrais poser au Conseil: le Conseil
envisage-t-il de prendre des mesures particulières pour protéger
les troupes et les missions humanitaires sur le
terrain, en Afghanistan? Que pense le Conseil de l'utilisation à
long terme de ce type de munitions et d'armes,
sachant qu'il s'agit d'armes à effet indiscriminé touchant
à la fois les populations civiles et les militaires?
----------------------------------------------------------------
2-170
Lannoye (Verts/ALE). - Ce sera très bref Monsieur le Président,
je n'ai pas eu de réponse à mes questions
concernant les armes et munitions à uranium appauvri. Est-ce
que je pourrais avoir confirmation par le Président
du Conseil de ce qu'il n'est pas en mesure de me répondre ?
2-171
President. - I think he is willing to answer your question. I cannot
answer as to whether or not he is able to give you
a reply.
2-172
Trillo-Figueroa, Consejo. - Señor Presidente, Señoría,
discúlpeme, pero la velocidad que imprime el tiempo y
que sus Señorías manejan tan adecuadamente me ha impedido
contestarle. Voy a hacerlo con mucho gusto.
En primer lugar, tengo que decirle que no coinciden nuestras informaciones
con las que ha manejado su Señoría.
Tengo información, que no importa desclasificar en este momento,
en la que se asegura que no se ha utilizado
munición con uranio empobrecido en Afganistán y así
también lo han indicado las unidades con equipos
detectantes NBQ en el propio Afganistán, dentro de la ISAF.
En segundo lugar y con respecto a su pregunta sobre qué medidas
de protección se habían tomado: aparte de ir
dotadas con los equipos de detección NBQ, las unidades que los
distintos países hemos desplazado, bien sea a
Kabul, bien -como en el caso español-también a Bagran,
las unidades médicas observan unas reglas de
conducta muy precisas y llevan a cabo un seguimiento constante, tanto
de ese tipo de posibles lesiones para la
salud, cuanto de riesgos que pudieran devenir de la situación
interna del propio país o de alguna resistencia.
En tercer lugar, tengo que recordarle que la Presidencia belga inició
un estudio, que continúa la Presidencia
española, sobre las medidas más adecuadas para garantizar
la salud de las tropas. Y, en último lugar, Señoría,
tengo que decirle que el comité científico que en España
estudió el problema -y fueron científicos independientes
de carácter universitario y clínico- garantizó
que no podía establecerse relación directa entre el uso del
uranio
empobrecido y ciertos tumores que se habían observado en algunos
de los combatientes.
======
Babelfish translation with other interpretation in [ … ].
European Parliament
Verbatim Report of Proceedings in original language
SITTING OF TUESDAY I, 9 APRIL 2002
Defence / armaments [ DU in Afghanistan ]
-------------------------------------------------------------
2-157
Lannoye (Verts/ALE). - Mr. President, I would like to mention a question
which concerns the two policies which
are the subject of the debate of this afternoon. It is about the problems
related to the use of weapons and
ammunition on depleted uranium.
I point out that on January 15 2001, the European Parliament voted for
a resolution asking the adoption of a
moratorium on the use of these weapons and for ammunition. Recently,
March 27 2002, the program of the United
Nations for the environment published the results of a study relating
to six sites touched by ammunition with
uranium depleted of Serbia and Montenegro during the war of Balkans
of 1999.
The study confirms a general contamination for five of the six sites
concerned; for two of these sites, one notes the
presence of uranium particles depleted in the neighbouring air. The
results of measurements show that depleted
uranium dust was largely dispersed in the environment following the
impact of these ammunition.
Even if the level of radioactive pollution is regarded as weak by the
program of the United Nations for the
environment, it does not remain about it less than this pollution confirms
the risks which a use of weapons and
ammunition with depleted uranium make run to the soldiers, of course,
but also with the civil populations, for
several generations undoubtedly.
Today, even if no official information confirms it, of many elements
accredit the thesis* according to which a great
part of the massively bombarded Afghan territory was contaminated by
depleted uranium: declaration of the
Secretary of State Romsfeld evoking a contaminated site*, concern expressed
by scientists Pakistani and
especially confirmation of the use of bombs radio-controlled with very
dense metal penetrants [penetrator
warheads*], probably of depleted uranium.
According to our information, the PNUE [UNEP] should start, in the next
weeks, a study relating to the
environmental impact of the war. Questions remain however that I would
like to pose with the Council: does the
Council plan to take particular measures to protect the humane troops
[aid teams?] and missions on the ground, in
Afghanistan? What thinks the Council of the long-term use of this type
of ammunition and weapons, knowing that
they are weapons for purpose indiscriminé [of indiscriminate
effect] concerning at the same time the civil[ian]
populations and the soldiers?
---------------------------------------------------------------- [question later in the session]
2-170
Lannoye (Verts/ALE). - It will be very short Mr. President, I did not
have an answer to my questions concerning
the weapons and ammunition with depleted uranium. Could I have confirmation
by the President of the Council of
what it is not able to answer me?
2-171
President. - I think he is willing to answer your question. I cannot
answer as to whether or not he is able to give you
a reply.
2-172
Trillo-Figueroa, Consejo. - Sir President, Señori'a, discu'lpeme,
but the speed that prints the time and that their
Señori'as handles has prevented me so suitably to answer to
him. I am going to do it with much pleasure.
In the first place, I must say to him that our information do not agree
with which it has handled its Señori'a. I have
information, that it does not matter to declassify at this moment [that
can be released], which makes sure that
depleted uranium ammunition has not been used in Afghanistan and thus
also they have indicated it the units with
NBQ [NBC} detectantes [detection] equipment NBQ in own Afghanistan,
within the ISAF.
Secondly and with respect to its question on what protection measures
had been taken: aside from going
equipped with the equipment with detection NBQ, the units that the
different countries we have moved, either to
Kabul, or - as in the case Spanish-also to Bagran, the medical units
observe very precise rules of conduct and
carry out a constant pursuit [ongoing health monitoring], as much of
that type of possible injuries for the health,
whatever of risks that could happen of the internal situation of the
own country or some resistance.
In third place, I have to remember him that the Belgian Presidency initiated
a study, that continues the Spanish
Presidency, on the measures more adapted to guarantee the health of
the troops. And, in last place, Señori'a, I
must say that the scientific committee to him that studied the problem
in Spain - and were independent scientists
of university character and clinical it guaranteed that direct relation
between the use of depleted uranium could not
settle down [be confirmed] and certain tumors that had been observed
in some of the combatants.
----------------------------------------------------------------
Source:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm
Select "Verbatim report of proceedings" and "by date",
then select April 9, 2002, and download PDF file. (NB This file is
1+ Mb, possibly slow to load).
Original lead: The Week Ahead, Financial Times, 8 April 2002
* Re Lannoye's questions the proposition that large Depleted Uranium
guided weapons may have been used in
Afghanistan was raised by Dai Williams with the UK Government via MPs
on 16th October and 1st November, and
on the Internet. This thesis, the weapons involved and recent Government
replies re DU in Afghanistan to UK MPs
were analysed in detail in his report "Depleted
Uranium weapons 2001-2002 - Mystery metal nightmare in
Afghanistan" 31 January 2002, sent
to UN and other aid agencies. It is available online at:
http://www.eoslifework.co.uk/du2012.htm
The Rumsfeld report of DU contamination in Afghanistan (16 January
2002) is quoted on page 120.
The issue was raised in the Pakistan publication Dawn by Aileen Qaiser
in Our lives are worthy too, on or
before 3 December.
This issue and the report were reviewed by Robert James Parsons in Le
Monde diplomatique, March 2002 at
http://mondediplo.com/2002/03/03uranium
. This article has raised concern in Europe about potential DU hazards
to ISAF troops in Afghanistan, probably the source of Lannoye's questions
reported above.
=====
D. Williams
eosuk@btinternet.com
Re:
the EU Plenary Session on Tuesday
(attached to previous message)
Lannoye asked good questions - more detailed than I expected.
However I have the following reservations about Trillo-Figueroa's
reply:
1) He says that DU munitions have not been used. This is not
consistent
with Rumsfeld's press statement on 16 January that reported radiation
from
DU missile warheads. It is interesting that ISAF is doing
radiation
monitoring. It is a matter for concern that they have not
detected
radiation when US forces have done. Either ISAF are monitoring
different
locations or not using accurate equipment or methods.
Other reports from Afghanistan indicate that ISAF are operating in
limited
locations - mostly in or near Kabul. Rumsfeld reported US
attacks on over
50 locations suspected of being Al Qaeda NBC targets. His
report suggested
the contamination was from Al Qaeda weapons. These locations
have not been
publicly identified by the US. It seems very unlikely that
ISAF have been
able to visit and test all these locations. My analysis suggests
7 DU
scenarios must be evaluated to include DU contamination by Al Qaeda
weapons
or DU material stores, US or other allied weapons, or all these
and in
populated and/or remote locations (report page 95).
Heavily bombed locations like Tora Bora and Gardez are still important
because
any significant DU contamination is likely to migrate by air and
water to wider
and more populated areas. (Re-activation of fine DU oxide dust,
60% < 1.5 microns
was described by Dr Chris Busby last year and conformed in the latest
UNEP report).
2) It is good to know that ISAF medical teams are conducting health
monitoring to include potential DU health effects on troops.
But is DU
health monitoring also being applied for all civilians including
Afghan
citizens and expatriates e.g. aid workers and media teams?
ISAF health monitoring in isolation is not sufficient. DU screening
needs to be
co-ordinated between military and civilians medical teams.
This requires UN (WHO)
co-ordination but they are restricted on nuclear health issues by
the IAEA, which
has strong links to the nuclear industry.
Health screening for recently deployed ISAF personnel that has not
yet
indicated DU contamination is not sufficient proof that DU weapons
have not
been used in Afghanistan. Potential DU exposure levels are
likely to be
lower now (in urban areas) than during the bombing 3-5 months ago.
Most
acute casualties would have died during the winter, concealed by
reported
epidemics of pneumonia and Crimean Congo Haemorrhagic Fever (one
covering
acute respiratory problems and the other internal bleeding, both
symptoms of
acute DU contamination - report page 105 >) . However DU exposure
risks
may increase again with summer heat, high winds and dust storms.
3) The third comment that Spanish research into DU health hazards
for KFOR
has not established a connection between DU and tumours is not at
all
re-assuring.
Similar results were reported by all NATO countries last year (compiled
in
the DoD report of 25 October 2001). But Dr Chris Busby's re-analysis
of
military epidemiological studies for Italian troops assigned to
the Balkans
found serious errors in analysis - using incorrect comparison groups.
Busby
identifies 11 x higher incidence of leukaemia and lymphoma than
expected in
an equivalent normal population. (http://www.llrc.org.uk
).
Spanish troops were deployed in the same Western Kosovo region as
Italian
troops - the area of highest bombing with new hard target guided
weapons
see Table 4, page 131.
EU MEP's would be wise to request full disclosure of DU health monitoring
data both for troops and civilians deployed in the Balkans and now
in
Afghanistan. Several European governments use known and suspected
DU
weapons including UK, France, Belgium, Netherlands, Italy and Germany.
Defence ministers and medical advisers should be expected to maintain
the
view that DU does not present significant health hazards in support
of US
and NATO use of DU weapons e.g. as stated in the latest UK MoD DU
research
proposal.
Given these factors the re-assurance that no DU has been used in
Afghanistan
is not convincing. For humanitarian reasons I hope that DU
has not been
used in Afghanistan, or if it has been used that exposure risks
will be
localised and very low. It is good to know that ISAF are alert
to potential
DU risks. But I am concerned that Trillo-Figueroa's statement
on 9 April
indicate over confidence that DU has not been used based on insufficient
environmental or health monitoring data.
Continuing investigations provided stronger indications that DU has
been
used in some guided weapon systems as suspected in my report but
not
previously disclosed by the US, UK or other governments.
The Pentagon
report of 16 January regarding Al Qaeda missiles with DU warheads
probably
refers to anti-tank missiles with tandem (shaped charge) warheads,
also
researched by UK defence researchers between 1995-1999 according
to the
latest UK MoD DU research proposal (March 2002), Appendix A.
These include
the European Milan and Trigat missile systems but similar weapons
are also
manufactured by Russia and several other countries.
Although ground launched anti-tank guided missiles use relatively
small
warheads (e.g. 1 kg excluding explosive in the Milan) they establish
the
principle that DU has been or can be used in shaped charge warheads.
Once
DU use is confirmed in shaped charge warheads (as reported on Jane's
website
in 2001) then all munitions using shaped charge warhead technology
become
suspect for DU use - including much larger warheads from 100 kg
in AGM-65
Mavericks and Hellfire up to 250+ kg in the AGM-142 Hav Nap and
first stage
of the BROACH warhead used in Storm Shadow / SCALP ER.
If DU is being used in shaped charge warheads for high penetration
applications then it becomes clear that arms manufacturers,
military and
governments are not inhibited in use of DU in larger weapon systems
than in
known 25, 30 and 120 mm anti-tank penetrators. Jane's website
also reports
that DU is used "to increase the penetration effect" of some guided
weapons
(report page 15).
I remain concerned that DU (U238 alloyed with Titanium, Niobium or
Molybdenum) is probably the main component in the advanced unitary
penetrator warheads. These are used in at least 7 guided bomb
systems
weighing from 100 - 1500 kg (Fig 1 page 89). These weapons
have been
used extensively in the Afghan bombing campaign (and some since
the Gulf War).
I conclude that the report to the EU Parliament yesterday that no
DU has
been used in Afghanistan cannot be trusted. The Pentagon has
already
reported that DU contamination from missile warheads has been found.
in Afghanistan - if only by Al Qaeda. The urgent questions
now are how
much has been used, where and by whom?
Dai Williams
eosuk@btinternet.com
References
----------------
(1) European Parliament Plenary Session 9 April 2002, Defence /
Armaments,
Verbatim report of proceedings at:
http://www.europarl.eu.int/plenary/default_en.htm
(2) DU weapons 2001-2002, Mystery metal nightmare in Afghanistan,
Jan 2002
at http://www/eoslifework.co.uk/du2012.htm
(Part 3 - Known and suspected DU weapons systems, pages 73-92, and
Table 4 -
Combat use of known and suspected weapon systems, page 131).
(3) Federation of American Scientists Systems Index (Land and Smart)
at
http://www.fas.org/man/dod-101/sys/index.html
(4) Proposal for a research programme on Depleted Uranium, Appendix
A, UK
MoD, March 2002 at:
http://www.mod.uk/issues/depleted_uranium/du_research/appendix_a.htm
Links :
- Dutch: depleted uranium in Amsterdam
- The Major Cause of Cancer
- Depleted Uranium Watch
- A Cancerous Web of Deception
- Gulf War Veterans Resource Links - DU LINK
- DU: Cancer as a Weapon
- Campaign Against Depleted Uranium CADU
- Wings of Death + second event theory - Chris Busby
- 1,3 billion victims by the nuclear nightmare Rosalie Bertell
- http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/index.html#DU
- ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE & HEALTH HAZARDS OF THE NATO BOMBINGS:
AN ANNOTATED URL REFERENCED LIST OF INTERNET ARTICLES, NEWS, PRESS RELEASES. [ PART 5 ] [Compiled by Dr. Janet M. Eaton, June 13, 1999 ]
naar bovenkant pagina
The VISIE Foundation
What
is 'Depleted Uranium'
Dutch homepage.
The VISIE Foundation