Taliban Claims Chemical/Radiotoxic Weapons Used by US Mon, 29 Oct 2001  From: martin meissonnier
Are ground troops and civilians at risk in "hard target"
smart bomb and cruise missile target zones?
 

Subject:  [du-list] Depleted Uranium in the Afghan War
     Date:     Tue, 6 Nov 2001 10:19:46 -0000
     From:    "Dai Williams" <eosuk@btinternet.com>
 Reply-To:  du-list@yahoogroups.com
       To:      "DU-list" <du-list@yahoogroups.com>

This analysis has been sent to the UK Government and media requesting an urgent answer to the questions it contains.  Is Depleted
Uranium the "dense metal" used in the new generation of hard-target smart bombs and cruise missiles?  If so how many have been
used in the Afghan war and where?  What precautions are intended for ground forces and civilians?

 Depleted Uranium in the Afghan War:

Are ground troops and civilians at risk in "hard target"
smart bomb and cruise missile target zones?

Update by Dai Williams, independent DU researcher, 30 October 2001

Summary

Internet sources from 1997 to date indicate that several 'hard target' versions of smart bomb and guided missile
systems used by Allied forces in Afghanistan may contain Depleted Uranium (DU) as a major component to
increase their penetration effect.

Of particular concern are systems that use the US "Advanced Unitary Penetrator" technology, or UK developed
MWS technology with "shaped charge" penetrators.

Reports from the Center for Defence information suggest that at least 500 tons of smart bombs and cruise
missiles have been used in the first three weeks of the Afghan war. They are most likely to have been used on
"high value targets" e.g. Taliban and Al-Qaeda command centres, airfields and other military installations.

This information is offered for verification with governments and military authorities out of concern for potential
DU exposure to UK, US and other Allied ground troops expected to be involved in search missions for Osama
bin Laden and other Al-Queda or Taliban leaders. Also due to concerns for potential exposure to local civilians,
international aid workers and media personnel.(1)

The US and UK governments take the view that use of Depleted Uranium in weapons presents no significant
hazards to human health. They have also denied that it is used in missile systems. However information from
Jane's Defence indicates that it has been used in at least one anti-tank missile system and in "shaped charge
warheads".(2) Analysis of multiple sources suggest that it may be a key component of several recent guided
weapon system upgrades.
 
 

Internet Sources

This report is based on three direct Internet sources plus links to manufacturers' websites from these prime sites:

     Jane's Defence Information http://www.janes.com
     General information about weapons systems, manufacturers bulletins and actions in the Balkans (4). Huge
     range of subjects, informed summaries but detailed information about weapons systems only available to
     subscribers. More DU information was available during the Balkans war. Good access.
     Federation of American Scientists http://www.fas.org
     Extensive information about weapons systems (5), historical records of government procurement plans and
     weapons development. Some pages seem quite old so need verification for most recent progress from other
     sources (e.g. Jane's).
     Center for Defence Information, Washington http://www.cdi.org
     Very concise strategic summaries of US military information by ex-military personnel. Its Terrorism Project
     gives a daily assessment of Afghan war operations and prime systems (6). Not as detailed as Jane's or
     FAS but easy to access, good links and useful for cross-referencing with other sites.

Military uses and health aspects of Depleted Uranium

DU has been used in weapons systems in the USA, UK, Russia and Israel for at least 15 years and exported to
over 20 nations. It has two special qualities for use in military applications:

          a) Very high density (1.7x heavier than lead) which gives it high kinetic energy for its volume.

          b) Pyrophoric properties - DU ignites at high temperature, melting through armour and adding
          incendiary effects to its munitions.

Depleted Uranium (Uranium 238) is the main by-product of refining Uranium ore for nuclear fuel. It emits high
energy but very short range Alpha radiation. In its pure metallic state it is relatively stable and safe to handle (e.g.
if ammunition is handled with gloves). However it presents two main health hazards:

     DU ignites at high temperature and burns into DU Oxide - a fine, Alpha-radioactive, toxic dust, easily
     inhaled, widely dispersed by wind and water, very hard to detect and to remove from the environment or the
     lungs.
     Military DU is not pure. It includes small quantities of highly radioactive and toxic isotopes including U236
     and Plutonium due to recycling nuclear fuel rods in DU processing. It was probably these other elements
     that enabled the UNEP survey team to trace DU in Balkans target zones.(3)

DU oxide contamination has been suspected as one source of Gulf War syndrome for several years. Other
recently acknowledged radioactive elements may be an additional factor in long-term illnesses, cancers and birth
defects suffered by civilians and veterans or their children exposed to DU during the Gulf War, and in Leukaemia
deaths of some NATO troops following the Balkans war.

Suspected of DU in hard target guided weapons

Since the Gulf War it has been known that several weapons systems use DU e.g. 30 mm armour piercing shells
fired by A10 planes and 120 mm shells fired by tanks. Both were used in the Gulf war. 30 mm shells were the only
DU munitions declared by the USA / Nato during the Balkans war.

The use of DU in smart bombs and cruise missiles was denied by Nato spokesmen during the Balkans war.
However, as a result of anomalies between UNEP findings early this year and radiation reports during the
Balkans war this possibility was researched again in January and February this year.(2)

The US and UK governments have been reluctant to discuss military uses of DU and its potential hazards. Both
declare that research proves DU is not a hazard to troops or civilians but take radiation precautions when using it
in test situations.

In April 1999 Greek scientists reported a dramatic increase in atmospheric radiation levels two weeks after the
start of the Balkans air war. I have been informed that they subsequently lost their jobs and their research was
closed down.

One explanation for the Greek measurements might be that DU has been used in larger weapons systems, and
therefore in far larger quantities and different locations than previously declared or studied.

Hard target guided weapons used to date in the Afghan War

First clues to the potential use of DU in guided weapons were picked up in the following document on the FAS
website:

          [Air Force Mission Area Plan (MAP)]

          ANNEX F Common Solution/Concept List (U)
          [as of 11 July 1997 - Rev 10]

          at http://fas.org/man/dod-101/usaf/docs/mast/annex_f/part26.htm

This included references to introducing or upgrading at least 9 systems to include "dense metal" penetrators or
ballast to increase their penetration effect and hard target capability. NB most cruise missile and guided bomb
systems have several warhead options e.g. for blast, sub-munitions (e.g. cluster bombs) or hard target capability.
It is the hard target versions that are of concern here.

Only two high-density metals are usually mentioned in descriptions of kinetic energy weapons - DU and
Tungsten. Both are similar in density (Specific Gravity 18+) but very different in material and manufacturing costs.
They may also be used in alloys.

Study of the Jane's, FAS and CDI websites indicates a number of smart bomb and guided missile systems with
upgraded features matching those described in the 1997 concept document. [NB: Abbreviated names / code
numbers may be confusing. Some refer to guidance systems, some to the main vehicle and some to warhead
types. The following notes have tried to make these distinctions clear].

Of these hard target systems the following have been reported on the CDI website, or expected to have been
used by the Jane's website, in Afghanistan since 7 October 2001.

For health and safety reasons the crucial question to ask the US and UK governments is this: Is the
'dense metal' used in any of these systems Depleted Uranium, or an alloy including DU?
 
 

1. Laser or GPS Guided Bombs

     GBU 28 Bunker Buster bombs and the upgraded version GBU 37: 5000 lb bombs of which 4,400 are
     "dense metal" penetrators. The GBU-37 upgrade uses a BLU-113 penetrator, improving on the converted gun
     barrels used for the original GBU-28 version improvised in the Gulf War.

     CDI's Action Update for Oct 11 refers: "Underground bunkers were also targeted using the 5,000 lb bunker
     buster… B-52's and B-1's with cluster and other penetrating bombs (possibly the BLU-109 and BLU-113 -
     DoD would not specify); enormous secondary explosions reported."

     GBU 24 Paveway III. 2000 lb bombs using the BLU-116 Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP) weighing 1700
     lbs. "The AUP features an elongated narrow diameter case made of a tough nickel-cobalt (steel) alloy called
     Air Force 1410. The AUP maximises sectional density by reducing the explosive payload and using heavy
     metals in the warhead case." (Note: this FAS description is the most explicit about the combination of alloy
     casing and dense metal ballast that seems to define the AUP penetrators, produced in several sizes). Designed
     to destroy hardened aircraft hangers and underground bunkers. Designed to replace the BLU-109.

2. Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAM)

     GBU 29, 30, 31, 32 feature 250, 500, 2000 and 1000 lb bombs respectively with all-weather GPS
     guidance systems. Originally designed by adding control fins to the BLU-109 and 110 hard target bombs.
     The new AUP warheads are designed to be direct substitutes for the 109 and equivalent bombs with twice
     the penetration power for the same size and weight. Refer 1997 proposed specifications on the FAS
     website and summary table in Tip of the Iceberg (2). Are AUP warheads now in use in JDAM systems?

     CDI reported 500 JDAMs used in week 1.

3. Cruise missiles

     AGM-86D CALCM (air-launched cruise missile). New version converted by Boeing from earlier nuclear
     warhead versions to include a 2000 lb Lockheed Martin Advanced Unitary Penetrator (AUP-3M) using "dense
     metal ballast". Long range missiles for hard target capability e.g. underground command bunkers. Most likely
     for targeting command posts in mountain caves as well as open locations.

     Jane's reports expects use of CALCM's in the Afghan operation but CDI reports do not mention them, except
     perhaps included in total cruise missile numbers (50-60 in week 1).

     US Navy sources denied use of DU in BGM-109 Tomahawk missiles during the Balkans war except for testing
     dummy nuclear warheads. But the Tactical Tomahawk Penetrator Variant commissioned in May 1999 "will be
     modified to incorporate the government-furnished penetrator warhead (AUP?) and the hard-target smart fuze".
     Delivery was scheduled for 2003 so it seems less likely that DU has been used in Tomahawk attacks in
     Afghanistan yet - unless for testing pre-production prototypes. This increases the likelihood that the AGM
     86D has been the cruise missile of choice for strategic "high value targets".

The 1997 procurement plans included a series of Small Smart Bombs (SSB's) weighing 250 lbs with 'the same
penetration capabilities as the BLU 109' - using "boosted penetrators with high density payloads". Proposed
applications included delivery as sub-munitions by Tomahawks and Joint Stand Off Weapons (JSOWs). Whether
these have been actually been developed for use in Tomahawks or JSOW's is not known.

Jane's refer to other guided systems in Afghanistan that include sub-munitions options with anti-armour capability or
shaped charge penetrators e.g. the AGM-154 JSOW (Joint Standoff Weapon), and SLAM-ER (Standoff Land
Attack Missile - Expanded Response). There is insufficient data to know whether these systems include suspected
DU components. However the UK BROACH warhead system (see below) was evaluated for the JSOW in 1998.

The AGM-158 JASSM (Joint Air to Surface Standoff Missile) has not been referred to in Jane's or CDI reports.
However its 1000 lb P31 penetrator with "dense metal case or dense metal ballast" was specifically identified in the
1997 procurement list. So far there is insufficient information to know whether it has been discontinued, is under
development, or has been used in prototype or production form in Afghanistan. It may be included in the unspecified
air launched systems used in Afghanistan. If so it is another potential DU based missile system. Further information
required.

Potential UK involvement in DU guided weapons systems

Another form of hard target system is the UK developed BROACH two stage MWS (Multiple Warhead System)
with a "shaped charge" penetrator.

The 2000 lb version was developed to prototype trial stage in summer 1998 for competitive evaluation with the
Lockheed Martin AUP for the upgraded Boeing AGM 86D CALCM. It was ground tested in South Wales and
may have been field tested in the Operation Desert Fox and the Balkans War. But British Aerospace Royal
Ordnance lost the Boeing contract to Lockheed Martin later in 1999.

The 1997 procurement list source suggested that a 1000 lb version of this alternative MWS hard target
technology was also under consideration for other applications e.g. the AGM 158 JASSM. It is not known
whether BAe/RO have continued development or production of BROACH /MWS warheads.

The BROACH system needs similar DU investigation with the UK government, even if it has been discontinued. If
it is currently in use, in production or prototype form, and if it has or may be used in Afghanistan, its "dense metal"
specifications need to be investigated. It is very curious that Jane's' description of DU uses included "shaped
charge warheads" in February 2001 (quote below) but that this description has been edited out of the current
website version (link below):

          Extracts from Jane's Defence website (Feb 2001)

          DU is a heavy metal that, when alloyed with titanium (up to 0.75% by weight), becomes a material
          with a density (18,600kg/m3) and ductility suited to making penetrators for kinetic energy anti-tank
          munitions, or liners for shaped-charge warheads.

          During the Balkans operations from 1992 to 1996, only the US Air Force acknowledges its use in
          some of its 30mm cannon shells fired from the GAU-8A cannon.

          It is true that some guided weapons used depleted uranium to increase the penetration effect and
          that the 20mm Phalanx close-in weapon system, used to protect warships at sea from sea-skimming
          missiles, also has a percentage of DU rounds.

          Current description at http://www.janes.com/defence/news/jdw/jdw010108_1_n.shtml
 
 

Evaluation of potential DU hazards in Afghanistan

One disturbing comment from Jane's was that the Military do not always know the materials used by
manufacturers since some may be used interchangeably. Since the US DoD and UK MoD both take a public
view that DU is not hazardous (at least in its metallic form) then the Military do not need any special instructions
for munitions that may contain DU. If this logic is sustained there is no reason to conceal the past or current use
of DU in smart bomb or cruise missile systems.

However if Military commands from any of the Allied forces have doubts about the potential use of DU munitions
against hard targets in Afghanistan this will be a matter for urgent and full information exchange between the
forces and governments concerned.

Note: although this paper concerns guided weapons that may contain DU any use in conventional systems e.g.
armour-piercing shells from the AC 130 gunship matter too.

The immediate operational concern is the likelihood that Special Forces will be expected to enter and inspect
strategic target locations, underground bunkers and caves if accessible. Unlike anti-tank shells which leave
distinctive entry holes there may not be obvious way for troops to distinguish potentially DU contaminated
locations from other bomb damage.

Local geography and climate may be important if significant quantities of DU have been used. Afghanistan has
more in common with Iraq than the Balkans - arid terrain prone to strong winds and dust storms. 300 tons of DU
was declared in the Gulf War. Elevated radiation readings are still reported in some areas, years later.

The new generation (post 1997) of guided bombs and cruise missiles with hard target capability may be using
DU in considerable quantities to achieve the increased penetration effects claimed by several upgraded systems
- possibly 50% of the overall weight.

The majority of hard target bombing appears to have been accomplished in the first two weeks of the campaign.
What's done is done. Potential DU use remains to be acknowledged, quantified and target locations identified.
The 18 months delay for the UNEP survey after the Balkans war will not be psychologically or politically
acceptable in the current conflict. However if DU has been used and this becomes known to the Taliban and Al
Quaeda it may encourage them to evacuate strategic target locations at the earliest opportunity, and not attempt
to return.

If DU munitions have been used in populated areas then contamination levels need to be assessed at the
earliest opportunity - not only for Allied troops but for the welfare of local civilians, aid and media workers. Scarce
water supplies are a special concern.

Unlike anti-tank shells guided bombs and missiles containing DU seem likely to oxidise most of the ballast load
and to dissipate the resulting DU oxide (and embedded isotopes) over a considerable area in debris and
dust-clouds.

Weapons designers and commissioning forces should have already evaluated these effects if the DoD and MoD
acknowledge the potentially toxic and carcinogenic effects of DU oxide dust. No DU safety evaluation data for
these systems has been located yet.

Questions for the US and UK Governments

The basic questions asked in Tip of the Iceberg remain to be asked and answered publicly:

1.Which guided weapons systems (i.e. guided missiles, smart bombs and sub-munitions) use Depleted
     Uranium as the "dense metal" involved in hard target penetrators, by itself or in alloy with other metals?
2.How many of the 1997 hard target system concepts have been produced in prototype or production form,
     or are still under development?
3.How many of these systems or their derivatives have been used in live tests and military operations since
     Operation Desert Storm?
4.How many countries currently have stocks of DU in guided or other weapons systems?

   And now these questions about its suspected use in Afghanistan:

5.   Which and how many weapons containing DU have already been used in the current Afghan War, and
    where? Have DU weapons been used there before?

6.   What is the estimate dispersal pattern of DU oxide fallout for each weapon? Will independent observers
    e.g. UNEP be allowed to commence environmental monitoring immediately?

   7.   What precautions will be taken to protect Allied ground troops from potential exposure to DU
       contamination?

   8.  What precautions will be taken to protect civilians and international aid teams, media, water supplies and
        agricultural land in potentially contaminated regions?

These concerns were submitted to the UK Government by Sir Paul Beresford MP at my request last week. Their
answers are urgent in view of the imminent despatch of UK and other Allied ground forces, and the welfare of
those already there.

These questions also have implications for communities and veterans involved in several recent conflicts who
may have been in the vicinity of smart bomb or cruise missile targets. They may require fundamental
re-evaluation of the consequences of DU health hazards and whether DU weapons systems comprise weapons
of indiscriminate effect.

The potential use of DU in hard target guided weapons has obvious tactical military advantages. But its potential
effects in large scale bombing campaigns may cause long term hazards for troops and civilians that seriously
outweigh most military justifications.

Dai Williams, independent researcher
Surrey, UK
eosuk@btinternet.com

References to previous discussion papers available from the author

1. Need for a DU Civilian Safety Handbook. 10 January 2001

2. Tip of the Iceberg? - apparent use of Depleted Uranium in bombs and missile systems. 25 Feb 2001. Includes
more links to original sources.

3. Use of Depleted Uranium in the Balkans War: will the UNEP report include "Dirty" DU and missile targets? 13
March 2001, updated 5 June 2001

Links used in this report

4. Janes report on Air and Missile strikes in the Afghan war
http://www.janes.com/security/international_security/news/jdw/jdw011007_1_n.shtml

5. FAS links to guided missile and bomb specifications:
http://www.fas.org/man/index.html

6. CDI Terrorism Project Action Update:
http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/actionupdate.cfm

Links :

• Gulf War Veterans Resource Links - DU LINK
• Campaign Against Depleted Uranium CADU
• Wings of Death + second event theory - Chris Busby
• 1,3 billion victims by the nuclear nightmare  Rosalie Bertell
• http://www.antenna.nl/wise/uranium/index.html#DU
• ECOLOGICAL CATASTROPHE & HEALTH HAZARDS OF THE NATO BOMBINGS:

AN ANNOTATED URL REFERENCED LIST OF INTERNET ARTICLES, NEWS, PRESS RELEASES. [ PART 5 ] [Compiled by Dr. Janet M. Eaton, June 13, 1999 ]